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Abstract
The novel approach presented in this paper accounts for the occurrence of the epistemic gap and 
defends physicalism against anti-physicalist arguments without relying on so-called phenomenal 
concepts. Instead of concentrating on conceptual features, the focus is shifted to the special charac-
teristics of experiences themselves. To this extent, the account provided is an alternative to the Phe-
nomenal Concept Strategy. It is argued that certain sensory representations, as accessed by higher 
cognition, lack constituent structure. Unstructured representations could freely exchange their 
causal roles within a given system which entails their functional unanalysability. These features to-
gether with the encapsulated nature of low level complex processes giving rise to unstructured sen-
sory  representations readily explain those peculiarities of phenomenal consciousness which are usu-
ally taken to pose a serious problem for contemporary physicalism. I conclude that if those concepts 
which are related to the phenomenal character of conscious experience are special in any way, their 
characteristics are derivative of and can be accounted for in terms of the cognitive and representa-
tional features introduced in the present paper.
Keywords: unstructured representations, phenomenal consciousness, phenomenal concepts, epis-
temic gap
COGNITIVE ARCHITECTURE
AND THE EPISTEMIC GAP:
Defending Physicalism
without Phenomenal Concepts
1. Introduction
This paper is about phenomenal consciousness and cognitive architecture. In what follows I shall 
argue that acknowledging the epistemic gap between conscious experience and the corresponding 
physical processes does not force us to abandon physicalism. To this extent the present account is in 
agreement with the so-called Phenomenal Concept Strategy (cf. Loar, 1990; Papineau, 2002; Stol-
jar, 2005). However, the aim of this paper is not to defend Phenomenal Concept Strategy; neither is 
it to provide a new version of it. Instead, I shall offer an alternative approach to the very same con-
clusion—namely that physicalistic explanations can account for the occurrence of the epistemic 
gap. 
 The present account disagrees with Phenomenal Concept Strategy on the role of phenomenal 
concepts. I shall claim that by focusing at phenomenal concepts, the Strategy  misidentifies the cog-
nitive underpinnings of the epistemic gap. The peculiar characteristics of conscious experience (e.g. 
Chalmers, 1996, 2003; Jackson, 1982; Levine, 1983; Shoemaker, 1981) are due to certain cognitive 
features of the experiences themselves, and not to the concepts—phenomenal or other—built  upon 
them. That is, the conceptual features that the Phenomenal Concept Strategy investigates are not the 
genuine causes of the special characteristics of phenomenal consciousness but only  symptoms 
which can themselves be explained in terms of the features of sensory representational states. 
2. Fodorian Framework
The chosen framework of this endeavour is Fodor’s theory (Fodor, 1987, 1998, 2008). Note, how-
ever, that this paper does not argue for the Fodorian view; it simply utilises his theory of concepts. 
On Fodor’s account sensory and phenomenal concepts are not in any way special. Such a frame-
work is helpful given that  what the paper intends to show is that in the context of phenomenal con-
sciousness conceptual features are at best explananda but not explanans.
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 The paper utilises the following picture of cognitive/perceptual architecture. The sensory  sys-
tem which consists of transducers and pre-conscious, modular processes connects the cognitive sys-
tem to the environment. Transducers convert the physical input (different forms of energy) into sig-
nals usable by  the rest of the sensory system which processes the information transformed by trans-
ducers.
 Sensory  representations or experiences form the interface between the sensory system and the 
cognitive system—they are the outputs produced by the sensory system and the inputs consumed by 
the central cognitive/conceptual system (which in turn controls behaviour). It is the particular sen-
sory  representation that transfers information about a distal layout (the object represented) for the 
conceptual system.
 Inside the conceptual faculty  what one can find are concepts and files. Concepts are atomic 
Language of Thought symbols which are nomically locked to the properties they  are concepts of. 
Concepts are associated with files which are placeholders for information about the property being 
represented by the concept. Files have two slots, one for perceptual prototypes (P-slot) and one for 
abstract knowledge (A-slot). Typically, P-slots get filled by perceptual templates via perceptually 
experiencing the object in question. The content of an A-slot, on the other hand, is what one reports 
when explaining the meaning of a particular concept. However, files are not constitutive of con-
cepts—on the Fodorian view concepts are strictly atomic LOT symbols. Nevertheless, concepts 
might have complex representational content (as most of them do) which might be accessible for 
further cognitive processing via the associated files if those are not empty (Margolis, 1999). 
 Take the example of seeing a day-old chick. When one, upon seeing a day-old chick, recog-
nises it and entertains the concept DAY-OLD CHICK what  happens in one’s conceptual faculty  is 
the following. The concept DAY-OLD CHICK is an atomic Language of Thought symbol which is 
asymmetrically causally dependent on day-old chick occurrences. The file associated to the DAY-
OLD CHICK concept has its P-slot  filled with a perceptual template of a day-old chick, and its A-
slot containing abstract knowledge of day-old chicks, like “it  is an animal”, “it has yellow feather” 
and so on.
 Perceptual templates filling P-slots are typically, but not necessarily formed via percep-
tion—they might also be formed from abstract knowledge. This is what, following Fodor and Pyly-
shyn, might be called simulation of look in imagery (Pylyshyn, 2002, 2003). According to these 
authors, imagination is simulation based on concept deployment. Combining concepts with percep-
tual prototypes in the P-slot of their associated files are accompanied by combining these perceptual 
prototypes. This is how one might acquire complex perceptual prototypes from abstract knowledge.
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 For instance, consider an ornithologist, who, as it happens, has not yet seen any day-old chick 
so far—not even pictures thereof. However, she knows everything that can be learned from descrip-
tions about the look of day-old chicks. This knowledge, together with her previous encounters with 
other birds via which she could form perceptual templates of wings, claws, bills etc. make her able 
to imagine day-old chicks. What she does is entertaining the combined concepts YELLOW, 
FEATHER, LEG and so on. Given that the P-slots of these concepts have already been filled, enter-
taining these concepts is accompanied by  visual memories of yellow, feather, leg, etc. Roughly 
speaking, the visual image she constructs on entertaining DAY-OLD CHICK is one that arises from 
remembering actual perceptions of feathers, legs, the colour yellow, and so on. 
3. Structured vs. Unstructured Perceptual Representations
Now compare what it is like to see a day-old chick with what it is like to see something red. Surely, 
there are major differences in the two experiential states. However, there is one particular difference 
which is of great importance. The experience of seeing a day-old chick could not be like what it  is 
without certain information about structure being conveyed in the experience. So, for example, the 
experience of seeing a day-old chick has as its constituent part in it the experience of seeing two 
legs with appropriate shapes and being in a certain position relative to each other and to other parts.
 Seeing a day-old chick is a complex experience that carries a lot of information about spatial 
structure that can be recovered by concepts. One could generate lengthy  and relevant descriptions of 
what day-old chicks are like, on the basis of a day-old chick picture. The stimulus is complex, and 
the experience makes this complexity available to cognition.
 Now compare this with the experience of seeing something red. Its stimulus is complex too—
it is a type of surface reflectance—still the experience does not make this complexity available to 
cognition in any way; the experience of seeing something red has no structure in the above sense.
 This leaves us with one of the fundamental claims of this paper: there are structured as well as 
unstructured representations in our cognitive architecture. Some might object here that my example 
of ‘seeing something red’ does not support the claim that colour experiences are unstructured. We 
do not see free-floating colours but coloured objects. Some even argue that we see the shape of an 
object in virtue of seeing its colours (Smith, 2010). However, the claim here is not that there is no 
structural information conveyed in everyday  cases of seeing colours. Seeing a red tomato, for ex-
ample, is a complex experience. The claim rather is that complex experiences are constituted by a 
structure of simpler experiences—one is able to discern constituent parts in one’s complex experi-
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ences,—and that there are certain constituents which themselves have no further constituent struc-
ture.
 An experience possesses constituent structure if and only if (1) it has discernible aspects or 
attributes (discernible at  least for trained subjects) which (2) can occur as experiences on their own 
as well as in other perceptual experiences. Constituent structure in most cases has the function of 
mapping some structure of the represented object—the pattern of relations among representational 
constituents conveys information about a certain external pattern of relations in the environment. 
So, for example, it is possible to discern the experience of seeing an appropriately shaped leg as a 
constituent part of the experience of seeing a day-old chick, and it is also possible to experience an 
appropriately shaped leg on its own without necessarily experiencing the day-old chick.
 Shape experiences, in general, have constituent  structure. It is possible to undergo visual ex-
periences of certain discernible parts of virtually all shapes without experiencing other parts at the 
same time. This is also reflected in some of the most popular accounts of visual shape representa-
tion (e.g. Biederman, 1987; Marr, 1982).
 On the other hand, some perceptual representations are unstructured. First, on the personal 
level, the what-it-is-likeness of being in these states possess no constituent structure in the above 
sense, second, on the sub-personal level, these perceptual representations are unstructured for fur-
ther processes. These unstructured representations do they map the structure of the represented ob-
ject. They only indicate the presence of the represented object—they are “inner light bulbs” which 
reliably  go on whenever a complex state of affairs obtains in the environment. I shall call such un-
structured sensory representations monadic markers. They are monadic since they possess no struc-
ture, and they are markers since they do not map the structure of the represented object, only indi-
cate its presence.
 Monadic markers typically do have discernible attributes, so-called primitive sensory features. 
However, primitive sensory features cannot occur as standalone experiences, and have no discerni-
ble experiential features other than themselves. Consider, for example, unique hue experiences (e.g. 
a Ganzfeld experience). A unique hue experience has hue, saturation and lightness as its primitive 
sensory  features. One is able to discern these attributes of, say, a red experience, however, one is 
unable to undergo an experience of a particular hue without experiencing a certain amount of satu-
ration and lightness at the same time. That is, unique hue experiences in general—and experiences 
of seeing something red (as e.g. a constituent of seeing a red tomato, see above) in particular—are 
monadic markers.
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4. Encapsulation
So far, it has been argued that  there are unstructured representations—monadic markers—mediating 
between sensory  input systems and the central conceptual system. Monadic markers, however, are 
unstructured only for certain processors, namely those residing within higher cognition. 
 Consider, for example, the experience of seeing something red. It is a mediator between the 
low level processes of the visual input system and the high level processes of the central system. 
For higher cognition, this experience is unstructured, and characterised by its primitive sensory  fea-
tures (specific values of hue, saturation and lightness). On the other hand, from the perspective of 
early visual processes it is a rather structured state of the mind—it is a result of a quite complex set 
of mechanisms taking place within the visual input system. 
 However, no matter how complex and structured these low level processes are, they remain 
hidden from higher cognition. Mechanisms within the input systems are modular and encapsulated, 
at least to a degree which makes these processes inaccessible to conscious reflection. One might 
have detailed knowledge about what happens in one’s visual system when one has the experience of 
seeing something red; nonetheless, one is unable to consciously  reflect on actual processes of one’s 
early visual system, nor can one consciously  influence these processes in any way. For such an in-
teraction to take place, a sufficiently direct and detailed information transfer would be required be-
tween these two levels of representation. This kind of information transfer certainly does not obtain 
between colour processing and propositional representation.
5. Causal Role Exchange and Functional Unanalysability
Now that the stage is set, I shall draw attention to a consequence of there being monadic markers in 
our cognitive architecture—playing a mediator role between the sensory systems and the central 
system—which turns out to be of crucial importance.
 This consequence is the possibility of causal role exchange: monadic markers, and unstruc-
tured representations in general, are able to exchange the causal role they play  in a system. The very 
same unstructured representation might play different causal roles in the same system at different 
times, and also, different unstructured representations might play  the very same causal role in the 
same system (or in different systems of the same type). 
 Intuition pumps back up this claim. In what follows two cases shall be considered: the case of 
colour versus shape experience inversion, and the case of role exchange between conceptual atoms 
versus sentences.
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 First, consider the contrast between colour experience inversion scenarios and visual shape 
experience inversion scenarios. It is quite easy to conceive of a colour experience inversion scenario 
where ripe tomatoes look to colour-inverted subjects the way  grass looks to the rest of the popula-
tion without there being any further difference in their cognitive architecture.
 Contrary  to this, visual shape experience inversion scenarios are harder to conceive of. If, due 
to some optical distortion, a subject misperceives circles as squares this tends to give rise to mis-
taken inferences in her mind about the shapes of certain objects. A fairly complex change in subse-
quent processing is needed to straighten out all geometrical inferences related to squares and circles 
in the subjects mind; and this is only a very simple case of shape inversion.
 Second, take two atomic symbols of Mentalese, X and Y. Suppose that, in subject A’s mind, X 
is locked to spoons, and has an associated file containing a perceptual prototype of spoons and rele-
vant abstract knowledge. Also in subject A’s mind, Y is locked to knives and has an associated file 
with proper contents. However, in subject  B’s mind, X is locked to knives and is associated with the 
knife-file, whereas Y is locked to spoons and has the spoon file associated with it. If the Fodorian 
view of concepts (in which atomic concepts are locked to the properties they represent and are as-
sociated with relevant knowledge) is right, then the role switch just sketched seems straightfor-
wardly possible. 
 Contrary  to this, the semantic inversion of sentences (complex linguistic representations) is an 
utterly strange idea. Imagine that the sentence “Bochum is in Germany” expresses a geographical 
fact for subject A, but for subject B it expresses the very zoological fact “giraffes are taller than 
dogs” expresses for subject A.
 The moral that follows is that complex representations are much more tightly  embedded in a 
system than unstructured representations. Two complex representations cannot assume each others 
causal role, for instance, without a significant reorganisation of the whole system, whereas unstruc-
tured representations seem to be able to exchange their causal role freely.
 Although causal role exchange between unstructured representations seems to be a coherent 
idea, it does not  follow that in adult subjects’ minds such an exchange can easily happen. For un-
structured representations UR1 and UR2 to exchange causal roles all the causal connections UR1 
has to other states and behaviour need to be assumed by UR2 and vice versa. That is, for minds in 
which a large number of learned connections are already  firmly  in place actual causal role exchange 
seems to be impossible. Therefore, what the possibility of causal role exchange really  means is this: 
the role an unstructured representation actually plays in a cognitive system could have been filled 
by some other unstructured representation equally well, in other words, the unstructured representa-
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tion in question does not fill the role it actually fills necessarily.
 This is an important consequence of being unstructured since it entails the functional unana-
lysability of unstructured representations. Since an unstructured representation does not fill the role 
it actually fills necessarily, knowing what role it fills (no matter how detailed the description is) 
does not help in specifying what unstructured representation it is that actually fills the role. Al-
though the causal role actually filled by the unstructured representation is characteristic of the un-
structured representation as a part of the actual system, since the very  same causal role could have 
been filled by a different  unstructured representation, it does not characterise the actual filler 
uniquely and thus does not distinguish it from other possible fillers. 
6. Explaining the Epistemic Gap
With all the resources at hand, it is time to see how the approach proposed here can account for the 
presence of the epistemic gap. 
 First, recall the case of the ornithologist who has never ever seen a day-old chick. Though the 
A-slot of the file associated to her DAY-OLD CHICK concept is filled with detailed propositional 
knowledge about day-old chicks, its P-slot is empty. Now consider that this is the first time she tries 
to imagine a day-old chick. Based on descriptions mentioning such simple shapes (e.g. feather, 
wing, claw, etc.) and colours (e.g. yellow) which the ornithologist has prior experience of she is 
able to simulate the look of a day-old chick. That is, her abstract knowledge drives her imagination 
resulting in a perceptual prototype which now fills the so far empty P-slot. Note that the P-slots of 
the files associated with the concepts YELLOW, FEATHER, and so on, must have been filled in 
order for abstract knowledge to be able to generate the day-old chick prototype by simulating the 
look.
 Now compare this case with the case of Mary (Jackson, 1982, 1986) the future neuroscientist, 
who has never ever seen anything red. However, she knows everything there is to know—in terms 
of descriptions—about seeing something red. That is, just  like in the case of the ornithologist, 
though the A-slot of the file associated to Mary’s concept RED is filled with detailed propositional 
knowledge, its P-slot  is empty. Nonetheless, there is an important difference between Mary and the 
ornithologist, namely that whereas the ornithologist is able to fill the relevant P-slot with a day-old 
chick prototype by simulating its look based on constituent structure, Mary (before leaving her 
room) is unable to fill the P-slot of the file associated to the concept RED with a red experience pro-
totype. What makes the difference here is the fact that while the experience of seeing a day-old 
7
chick is structured the experience of seeing something red is not. The latter is a monadic marker, an 
unstructured representation, and as such its perceptual prototype cannot be simulated on the basis of 
the abstract knowledge Mary could acquire within her chamber.
 To see why  this is so, let’s first  unpack what happens with Mary. Before her release, she learns 
from books that seeing something red is identical with a salient neurological response pattern in 
subjects’ V4 what she calls “neuro response X”, and so forms the concept NEURO RESPONSE X 
of it. That is, the A-slot of the file associated to pre-release Mary’s NEURO RESPONSE X concept 
is filled with relevant neurological information, but its P-slot is empty—she has no idea of the rele-
vant phenomenal character of occurrent neuro responses.
 Then, after her release, Mary  is shown a piece of paper with a patch of red on it (Nida-
Rümelin, 1996). She locks the dummy concept XYZ to this kind of stimulus. (According to Fodor’s 
innateness thesis, our conceptual system is full of dummy concepts waiting to get locked to a new 
kind of stimulus. One does not need to buy innateness here though, for one could argue that  Mary 
acquires a new concept XYZ which is nomically locked to perceived redness.) Whereas the P-slot 
of the associated file is filled with the perceptual prototype of red, its A-slot is at least nearly empty. 
Nonetheless, deployment of the concept XYZ helps Mary  in recognising and categorising new va-
rieties of the red stimulus, and in this way, contextual information can fill the A-slot of the associ-
ated file with information like “it is the colour of London buses”, or “it is the colour of ripe toma-
toes”.
 Note, that there is no a priori connection between Mary’s XYZ and NEURO RESPONSE X 
concepts. First, Mary cannot fill the A-slot of XYZ with information like “neuronal activation X” 
based on introspection when seeing something red, because this level of processing is encapsulat-
ed—inaccessible to conscious reflection.
 Second, Mary  is unable to fill the P-slot of NEURO RESPONSE X up with a perceptual tem-
plate of a red experience solely  on the basis of the content of its A-slot. Since it  is a monadic 
marker, an unstructured representation, it  has no constituent structure that could help Mary (like 
prior experiences of wings and claws helped the ornithologist). Nor has Mary access to the primi-
tive sensory features of red experiences—primitive sensory features do not  form standalone experi-
ences, the only  way to experience them is as features of the overall experience (seeing something 
red), which is exactly what Mary lacks.
 Moreover, neither structural nor functional information conveyed by  the abstract  knowledge 
in the A-slot is of any  use. Structural information cannot help in simulating monadic markers due to 
the fact that monadic markers lack any structure, and functional information cannot  help either due 
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to the functional unanalysability of monadic markers.
 The only  way for Mary  to connect the two concepts is via filling the A-slot of the XYZ con-
cept with contextual information she is familiar with from her pre-release studies. If, for example, 
Mary learns that XYZ is utilised when seeing the colour of London buses, and if she has learnt in-
side her room that NEURO RESPONSE X answers to the colour of London buses in neuro-typical 
individuals, then she can conclude that XYZ is NEURO RESPONSE X that is, that these two con-
cepts co-refer. In effect, the A-slots of the two concepts can get merged—all the conceptual infor-
mation associated with XYZ gets associated with NEURO RESPONSE X, and vice versa: all scien-
tific information associated with NEURO RESPONSE X gets associated with XYZ. 
 However, even if one can link and merge the A-slots, the phenomenology is tied to the P-slots. 
This entails, that when the content of a P-slot consists of monadic markers—since one is unable to 
fill such a P-slot solely on the basis of the corresponding A-slot—abstract knowledge necessarily 
leaves out the phenomenology. That is, no matter how detailed abstract knowledge can get via 
merging with the A-slots of scientific concepts, it remains ineffective in simulating the phenome-
nology if one lacks the basic constituents—monadic markers—of the perceptual template.
 This is the epistemic gap, and also the reason why we have the intuition that the physical and 
the phenomenal are distinct.
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